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Abstract. When two people disagree about matters of taste, neither of them is in
the wrong: There is nothing contradictory in an exchange where one person says
‘The rollercoaster was fun!’ and the other responds ‘No, it was not fun.’ This is in
sharp contrast to disagreements about objective facts. This phenomenon is known
as faultless disagreement, and is at the heart of theorizing about subjective adjec-
tives. Despite this fundamental role, little scrutiny has been given to the empirical
proﬁle of faultless disagreement. Our experiment addresses two questions: (i) Is
faultless disagreement a property of predicates, or of pairs of a predicate and an
argument? (ii) Is faultless disagreement a binary phenomenon? Our results show
that judgments of faultless disagreement (i) are modulated by the choice of argu-
ment, reﬂecting the prevalence of opinions in the relevant population, and (ii) fall
into at least three distinct tiers, suggesting that faultless disagreement is a gradient
phenomenon.
Keywords. subjective predicates; predicates of personal taste; faultless disagree-
ment; experimental linguistics
1. Introduction. Consider the following simple disagreements over objective facts:
(1) Arnold: The shirt is cotton.
Barbara: No, it’s not cotton.
(2) Amy: That knife is plastic.
Bob: No, it’s not plastic.
In both of the above cases, A asserts some proposition p, and B asserts its negation, ¬p. And
it clearly must be the case that one of the two people is factually wrong. In other words, dis-
agreement over objective facts licenses the intuition that someone must be wrong, or ‘at fault.’
Consider now the following simple disagreements over matters of subjective opinion:
(3) Arnold: That rollercoaster was fun.
Barbara: No, it was not fun.
(4) Amy: That sandwich was tasty.
Bob: No, it was not tasty.
Here, again, it seems that A has asserted p, and B has asserted ¬p, but this time it’s intuitive
to say that neither one is factually wrong, or at fault. People can differ over matters of opin-
ion without either having made a factual mistake. This has been a truism since antiquity—see,
for instance, the Latin maxim De gustibus non est disputandum, translated fairly literally as
‘ In matters of taste, there can be no disputes,’ but more colloquially as ‘There’s no accounting
for taste.’ The technical term for this truism in philosophy and semantics is FAULTL ES S DIS -
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AGREEMENT: the intuition that people can disagree over matters of taste without either party
being wrong or ‘at fault.’
Despite being a truism since antiquity, faultless disagreement is surprising and problem-
atic for standard semantic assumptions, on which for any proposition p, either p or ¬p must
be false. So how can it be that predicates of personal taste (PPTs) and other subjective adjec-
tives license the intuition that both can be true (Ko¨lbel 2004)? Faultless disagreement has been
used to motivate re-examining the fundamental nature of semantic denotata and the context-
sensitivity of semantic computation (e.g. Lasersohn 2005, MacFarlane 2014); it has also been
put forward as an empirical diagnostic for subjectivity, which is argued to carry explanatory
weight with respect to things like adjective-ordering preferences (e.g. Scontras et al. 2017).
Given the importance being placed on faultless disagreement as an empirical desideratum for
various proposals, we need to understand what it’s actually telling us, and how it actually
works.
1.1. FAULTLESS  DISAGREEMENT  AS  A DIAGNOSTIC FOR THE SUBJECTIVITY  OF ADJECTIVES . A 
common assumption is that if a predicate allows  faultless  disagreement, it is subjective.
(5) A: This cake is tasty.
B: No, it is not tasty!
In this case, both people can be in some sense ‘ right,’ so we can conclude that tasty is subjec-
tive.
(6) A: This cake is gluten-free.
B: No, it is not gluten-free!
In the above case, one person has to be wrong, so we can conclude that gluten-free is not sub-
jective.
For each of these simple cases, the reasoning is categorical: either a predicate is subjective
or it isn’t. This reasoning can be deployed in a gradient manner as well: we could talk about
how faultless a disagreement is, and therefore how subjective the predicate is. The point is that
in either case, faultless disagreement is taken to represent some property of the predicate sim-
pliciter. We are skeptical of this reasoning, because it doesn’t take into account the identity of
the object of predication.
The identity of the object of predication can have strong effects on the degree of consen-
sus of an opinion, i.e. on how widely-held or prevalent that opinion is within a particular pop-
ulation. (Nota bene: we’re assuming a broadly US-centric cultural perspective here—see §5.1
for further discussion. In the present work, for ease of presentation, we divide degrees of con-
sensus into three levels, illustrated in (7):
(7) Three levels of consensus
a. Snails are tasty. divisive (lower consensus)
b. Donuts are tasty. widely liked (high consensus)
c. Paper is tasty. inedible (near-unanimous consensus)
If faultless disagreement is purely a reﬂex of the subjective predicate itself (e.g. tasty, fun, etc),
then the object of predication should be irrelevant, and the prevalence of the relevant opinion
in the population should be irrelevant. All predicates that are subjective should yield faultless
disagreement, regardless of what they are predicated of. We suspect that this view is (implic-
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I) Is faultless disagreement a property of predicates simpliciter, or a property of pairs of a
predicate and an object of predication?
II) Is faultless disagreement a binary phenomenon, or a gradient one?
We investigate both of these questions using opinions about foods as a case study. We
chose attitudes about foods as our initial starting point because people tend to have fairly clear
intuitions about the level of consensus of food-related opinions.
2. Experiment. We used opinions about food to assess whether the level of consensus of an
opinion modulates the level of faultless disagreement. If yes, this would provide evidence that
faultless disagreement is not simply a property of predicates—as often seems to be implic-
itly assumed in prior work—but rather a property of predicate-argument pairs. Because fault-
less disagreement has been used as a proxy for other properties of predicates, like subjectivity,
and has driven theorizing about the semantics of predicates that display it, the ﬁnding that it is
modulated by the choice of argument (i.e., the object of predication) would need to be grap-
pled with in both domains.
2.1. DIFFERENT  LEVELS  OF CONSENSUS . We tested people’s  perception of whether agreement 
is faultless  with three different levels  of consensus about foods: First, when the food is typi-
cally  seen as divisive  (e.g.  Brussels  sprouts, anchovies, blue cheese)—i.e.,  the level  of consen-
sus about the opinion is low. Second, when there is broad consensus about the food being tasty 
(e.g.  chocolate, cake, pizza, ice cream)—i.e.,  the level  of positive consensus is high. Third, we 
also tested items that are (near-)unanimously viewed as inedible, though still technically con-
sumable (e.g.  dirt, paper, sand)1—i.e.,  a context where the level  of negative consensus is very 
high. Comparing this third condition to the other two—in essence:  things people normally eat 
vs.  things people do not normally eat—provides a way of checking whether a very striking 
difference in consensus levels  about predicate-object pairs will  modulate perception of faultless  
disagreement.
In order to identify the items to use for each category, we used existing surveys and pre-
testing in order to identify eight different items for each category. We initially also considered
testing foods that are widely disliked but still qualify as foods—i.e., a category of widely dis-
liked foods where the level of negative consensus is high. Such a category would pair well
with the category of widely liked foods where the level of positive consensus is high. How-
ever, we decided to not include this category in our initial experiment, because it is hard to
identify foods that are widely disliked. It appears that, typically, whenever something is cul-
turally regarded as a food, even if it is not widely liked there still seems to be a certain non-
negligible number of people who like it. In essence, given our relatively coarse-grained category-
based approach, it was unclear what the cut-off would be for something to qualify as widely
itly) assumed by most prior work.
1.2. AIMS OF THIS WORK. We conducted a psycholinguistic experiment to take steps towards 
addressing two questions about the empirical status of faultless disagreement:
1 The hope is that by using things that are technically consumable, we can avoid problems associated with the 
predicate being simply inapplicable to its argument.
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disliked rather than merely divisive. We felt that based on existing studies and our own U.S.-
based pre-testing, we could reliably identify foods that are divisive but not foods that are (reli-
ably) widely disliked.
Importantly, it should be noted that although we used these three categories in our study,
we do not regard them as monolithic categories (with the possible exception of the inedible
category). Foods within each category can vary in how strong the consensus about each food
is. We admit that in the present study we approach the effects of consensus from a relatively
coarse-grained perspective, by splitting foods into (i) widely liked (high consensus) vs. (ii) not
widely liked (lower consensus). An important direction for future work is a more ﬁne-grained
investigation that treats level of consensus as a fully gradient dimension without breaking it
into categories. This will allow us to also gain insights into higher vs. lower levels of negative
and positive consensus.
2.2. METHOD. Participants. We report the results for 52 self-identiﬁed adult native English 
speakers who participated over the internet.
Design. We constructed written mini-conversations between two people who disagree
about whether a given food (or nearly inedible item) tastes good or bad, as exempliﬁed in Fig-
ure 1 and examples (8a,b). The ﬁrst speaker uses a predicate of personal taste in a predicative
construction (e.g. Black licorice is yucky) and the second speaker disagrees by using ‘not’ (e.g.
Black licorice is not yucky).
In the target items, we manipulated the prevalence of the opinion about the food (as de-
scribed above) to test three conditions, listed here in order of increasing consensus: (i) divisive
foods (low consensus), (ii) widely liked foods (high consensus) and (iii) (nearly) inedible items
(very high consensus).
All target items consisted of short mini-dialogs using predicative sentences (examples
8a,b, Figure 1). Participants saw eight targets in each of the three conditions, for a total of 24,
and each target had a different food item (or (nearly-)inedible item) in subject position. We
used two positive PPTs (tasty, delicious) and two negative PPTs (yucky, disgusting) in the tar-
get items. Each food item/nearly-inedible item occurred with both a positive and negative PPT
in different versions of the experiment. E.g. we tested both Snails are disgusting/Snails are not
disgusting as well as Snails are tasty/Snails are not tasty, and Chocolate is yucky/Chocolate is
not yucky as well as Chocolate is tasty/Chocolate is not tasty.2 The preamble ‘Eating things:’
was included on targets to ensure that the dialogs about inedible things (e.g. Sand is disgust-
ing) would still be construed as discussion about food/taste.
The study also included 10 ﬁller mini-dialogs about activities described with different
PPTs and designed to vary in their level of consensus (e.g. Waiting in line is fun/not fun; Doing
yoga is boring/not boring). Fillers were preceded by the preamble ‘Doing things:’. Four addi-
tional attention-check trials were included to ensure participants were paying attention to the
items. Only participants who gave correct answers to at least three out of four attention-check
and whenever the ﬁrst speaker uses a positive adjective, the second speaker expresses a negative evaluation of the
food item (not + positive adjective). (See also Scontras et al. 2017 for use of ‘not’ to create pairs of statements in
a faultless disagreement task.) Thus, all targets are uniform in the sense that they involve two opposing subjective
statements.
2 We do not discuss the negative/positive distinction further here. Crucially, each target item consisted of two 
opposing statements by the two speakers (e.g. tasty / not tasty; yucky / not yucky). Whenever the ﬁrst speaker uses a 
negative adjective, the second speaker expresses a positive evaluation of the food item (not + negative adjective),
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trials and to two unambiguous practice items were included in subsequent analyses.
Procedure. Participants read the dialogs presented in writing on the computer screen (Fig-
ure 1). The dialog was shown on the same page as a six-point rating scale. Participants were
instructed to read each conversation carefully and to indicate whether they thought it was pos-
sible for both people to be right or whether one person was wrong.3 They were instructed to
select “1” if they strongly feel that one of the two people is wrong (lets call this faultful or
faulty disagreement), to select “6” if they strongly feel that both people can be right (faultless
disagreement), and to use the numbers between 1 and 6 for intermediate responses.
Thus, if a participant selects a high number on the scale, this indicates that they interpret
the disagreement as faultless (both people can be right). Conversely, if a participant selects
a low number, this indicates that they judge the disagreement to be ‘ faulty’ (one of the two
people is wrong). High numbers mean high rates of faultless disagreement.
On the same screen, participants also indicated how conﬁdent they were in each of their
answers, using a six-point scale from “not conﬁdent” (1) to “very conﬁdent” (6). On average,
conﬁdence levels were higher than 5 out of 6 in every condition, and will not be discussed
further.
Each item was presented on its own screen, and participants completed the study at their
own pace.
(8) a. One person says: Blue cheese is tasty.
Another person says: Blue cheese is not tasty.
b. One person says: French fries are disgusting.
Another person says: French fries are not disgusting.
Figure 1. Sample item and faultless disagreement rating scale
3. Predictions. We consider three possible outcomes about whether the prevalence of an opin-
ion modulates how we perceive disagreements concerning that opinion:
No effect of opinion prevalence on perception of faultless disagreement: First, if fault-
less disagreement is a reﬂex only of the (subjective) nature of the predicate, as seems to be
important issues for future work and we touch upon some of them in §5.1.
3 On the answer choices indicated for the rating scale, we did not further elaborate on what is meant by ‘wrong’ or 
‘right,’ but the instructions made clear that two people with different opinions could both be right. In other words, the 
instructions explained that disagreement can be faultless. Nevertheless, we acknowledge that people can be wrong or 
right in different ways and that perceptions of these issues are also sensitive to social norms and standards. These are
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implicitly assumed in prior work, we expect to see comparably high rates of faultlessness in all
three conditions, regardless of whether the subject of the sentence refers to a divisive food, a
widely liked food or a (nearly) inedible item—in other words, the object of predication should
have no effect. This is because all targets use predicates of personal taste. Thus, according to
this view, all three conditions should elicit equally high ratings on the six point scale. (Recall
that ‘6’ = faultless disagreement.)
Opinion prevalence matters but only in extreme cases: Alternatively, it could be the case
that if an opinion is near-universal, this kind of extreme situation is strong enough to modu-
late how we perceive disagreements concerning that opinion. If one person expresses an opin-
ion that virtually everyone agrees with (e.g. sand is not tasty) and another person expresses an
opinion that virtually no one else shares (e.g. sand is tasty), this could be perceived as a situ-
ation where that second person is in the wrong. In this case, we expect a two-way split, such
that disagreements concerning inedibles are rated more ‘ faulty’ (lower on the 6-point scale)
than disagreements concerning edibles. The two edible categories (widely liked and divisive)
are predicted to pattern together.
Opinion prevalence has gradient effects on perception of faultless disagreement: A
third possibility is that faultless disagreement is gradiently sensitive to degree of consensus. In
this case, we expect to see a three-way contrast, such that decreasing consensus elicits more
faultless disagreement. In the case of extremely high-consensus opinions, anyone who dis-
agrees would be judged as being in the wrong (low ratings on the 6-point scale)—this is the
‘ sand is (not) tasty’ situation described above. Furthermore, if effects of opinion prevalence
are gradient, we also expect a difference to emerge between widely-liked foods (high level of
consensus) and divisive foods (lower level of consensus): Disagreements about divisive foods
are expected to be judged as more faultless (higher ratings on the 6 point scale) than disagree-
ments about widely-liked foods. Thus, under this view, disagreements concerning inedibles
would receive the lowest ratings (most ‘ faulty’ ), disagreements about widely liked foods would
fall somewhere in the middle and disagreements about divisive foods would be receive the
highest ratings (most faultless).
4. Results and discussion. Figure 2 shows the average faultless disagreement ratings for each
condition. Higher ratings indicate more faultless disagreement (both people can be right); lower
ratings indicate more ‘ faulty’ disagreement (someone is wrong).
As can be seen in Figure 2, the inedible condition (high levels of consensus) yields lower
ratings than both divisive foods (lmer on z-scores, |t|=15.9, p<.0001) and liked foods (|t|=19.7,
p<.0001). In other words, if someone ﬁnds sand tasty, they are more likely to be viewed as
being in the wrong than someone who disagrees about either a liked or a divisive food. The
ﬁnding that all three conditions do not pattern alike goes against the ﬁrst possibility we considered—
that faultless disagreement is a reﬂex only of the (subjective) nature of the predicate, unrelated
to the object of predication. The low ratings for inedibles show that the level of consensus
about predicate-object pairs does have an effect.
Furthermore, we also ﬁnd a difference when we directly compare widely-liked foods and
divisive foods: Widely-liked foods receive lower ratings (more ‘ faulty’ disagreement) than di-
visive foods (|t|=4.87, p<.0001). This result goes against the second possibility we consid-
ered, which was that that effects of consensus only distinguish between near-universal vs. non-
universal opinions in a binary way: Our results suggest that perception of faultless disagree-
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ment is sensitive to levels of consensus in a more gradient way. Thus, in a disagreement about
whether a widely-liked food tastes good, someone is more likely to be judged as being wrong
than in a disagreement about whether a divisive food tastes good. Ultimately, our ﬁndings sup-
port the third possibility: Ratings of faultless disagreement are sensitive to degree of consen-
sus.
1 2 3 4 5 6
divisive
widely liked
inedible
Faultless disagreement ratings (1=One person is wrong, 6=Both can be right)
Figure 2. Faultless disagreement ratings as a function of condition. Error bars show +/- 1 SE
5. General discussion. We’ve shown that judgments of faultless disagreement (at least in the
domain of food) are gradient, and modulated by the object of predication—speciﬁcally, by the
level of consensus regarding its tastiness or lack thereof. This is contrary to what is implicitly
assumed in prior work, much of which treats faultless disagreement as a categorical diagnostic
that reﬂects properties of the predicate alone.
We highlight both methodological and theoretical ramiﬁcations of this ﬁnding. Our re-
sults show that measures of faultless disagreement do not directly reﬂect the subjectivity of
the predicate—they reﬂect this only mediated by the choice of the object of predication. The
higher the degree of consensus there is about a predicate-argument pair, the more faulty a dis-
agreement is rated. Methodologically, then, this shows that researchers must control carefully
for the choice of object of predication before any conclusions can be drawn about what the
availability of faultless disagreement tells us about the subjective character of a predicate. In
particular, if disagreement over a predicate is judged faulty, it must be shown that this is not
an effect of degree of consensus about the applicability of the predicate to the object.
Our results show that even tasty, the poster child of subjective predicates, does not consis-
tently license an intuition of faultless disagreement—disagreements about tastiness are judged
(relatively) faulty if there is enough consensus about the (in)applicability of tasty to what it
is being predicated of. This fact has theoretical ramiﬁcations, as predicting faultless disagree-
ment for subjective predicates has been taken to be a desideratum in developing theories of
subjective meaning. Our results show that theoretical explanations of faultless disagreement
over PPTs must make some reference to the prevalence of a judgment within the relevant pop-
ulation. Analyses on which subjective predicates involve generic quantiﬁcation might account
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for these effects straightforwardly in the semantics (e.g. Anand 2009, Pearson 2013); other ac-
counts of subjective predicates (e.g. Lasersohn 2005, Coppock 2017) might account for these
facts in the pragmatics, perhaps by appealing to the notion that the less prevalent an opinion
is, the more doubtful the sincerity of one who claims to hold it. For a rigorous pragmatic ac-
count of the relation the prevalence of an attribute in the population and the acceptability of a
generic statement, see Tessler & Goodman (2019).
5.1. FUTURE DIRECTIONS . Our results show that judgments of faultless  disagreement are sensitive 
not just to the predicate, but to the object of predication, in a way that we suggest reﬂects the 
degree of consensus in the relevant population, and fall  into at least three statistically  distinct 
tiers, suggesting that faultless  disagreement is a gradient phenomenon. Though we do not argue 
that these ﬁndings support or invalidate any particular theories of the semantics of subjective 
predicates, we do strongly suggest that the phenomenon of faultless  disagreement itself  deserves 
much more empirical scrutiny, seeing as it has played a foundational role in the development of 
such theories.
For instance, a variety of recent proposals seek to explain the behavior of subjective predi-
cates in terms of their experiential nature, rather than their formal semantics (e.g. Mun˜oz 2019,
Rudin & Beltrama 2019, Willer & Kennedy 2019—see also Bylinina 2014, McNally & Sto-
janovic´ 2017, Kaiser & Herron Lee 2017, 2018 for related work on the role of experience in
the semantics of subjective predicates). Rudin & Beltrama argue that the intuition of faultless
disagreement can be explained in terms of the plausibility of both parties having competently
evaluated the object of predication, and having sincerely come to different conclusions. Pro-
posals of this nature make predictions about what factors should be able to manipulate the in-
tuition of faultless disagreement. In ongoing work, we investigate two factors that are predicted
to affect the availability of faultless disagreement.
(9) Effects of socio-cultural context (e.g. US vs. Thailand):
A: Crickets are tasty.
B: Crickets are not tasty.
To most Americans, crickets might be judged inedible. But in Thailand, they’re a popular bar
snack. If perceived consensus in the relevant population pushes around judgments of faultless
disagreement, then ratings from participants in different populations should diverge sharply if
those populations differ sharply in their degree of consensus about the object of predication.
To put it another way: a participant from a culture in which crickets are considered a food
should ﬁnd it much more plausible that a competent evaluator would sincerely ﬁnd them tasty
than a participant from a culture in which theyre considered inedible would.
(10) Effects of expertise (e.g. oenophilia):
Layperson: This wine is disgusting.
Master sommelier: No, this 2017 Chaˆteauneuf-du-Pape is exquisite.
In many areas of food culture, perhaps most notoriously when it comes to wine, privilege is
given to the expert judgment of initiated sophisticates. If the intuition of faultless judgment
requires the assumption that both parties in the disagreement are competent evaluators of the
applicability of the predicate to its argument, we might expect disagreements between asses-
sors of unequal expertise to be judged more faulty than disagreements between assessors of
equal expertise.
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In addition to these two factors, ongoing work also investigates the role of ﬁrst-person
experience in judgments of faultless disagreement. In the experiment presented here, we re-
lied on social consensus/norms about which foods are divisive and which are widely liked. An
important future step is to assess the extent to which people’s own likes and dislikes shape
their perceptions of faultless disagreement. PPTs have been shown to give rise to an ‘acquain-
tance inference’—if somebody says something is tasty, we infer that they have tasted it per-
sonally (Ninan 2014, Anand & Korotkova 2018)—and have been analyzed by appealing to
a privileged role for ﬁrst-person experience (Moltmann 2006, 2010, Pearson 2013, Gunlog-
son & Carlson 2016). Not everyone likes foods typically viewed as tasty. If someone dislikes
chocolate, would they rate disagreements about chocolate as more faultless than someone who
likes chocolate, even though both people know that chocolate is viewed as a typically high-
consensus tasty thing in the U.S.? If somebody absolutely loves anchovies, are they more
likely to rate disagreement about anchovies being tasty as more faulty than someone who only
has lukewarm feelings about anchovies, despite knowing that their preference places them in
a minority? Put another way, when we ask a participant whether ‘someone is wrong,’ do they
assess ‘wrongness’ in terms of alignment with their own preferences? And is the ‘wrongness’
of disagreement over inedibles reducible to the strangeness of the implication that both parties
have eaten, e.g., sand? The question of whether the degree-of-consensus effects that we found
are modulated by people’s own opinions (or by their perception of the appropriateness of ac-
quiring that opinion in the ﬁrst place) is an intriguing direction for future research.
5.2. UPSHOT. The upshot of this paper is that judgments of faultless  disagreement are affected by 
the object of predication, rather than directly reﬂecting the subjectivity of the predicate sim-
pliciter, and, furthermore, that perceived consensus about the applicability of the predicate to 
that object is an important factor in explaining why. Further investigations into exactly  which 
other factors push judgments of faultlessness around will  be crucial to developing a richer un-
derstanding of the ramiﬁcations of faultless disagreement for the theory of subjective predi-
cates.
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